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Mary Gregory, Wiemer Salverda, and Ronald Schettkat 
The  “jobless  growth” experienced in the United States in the eco­
nomic cycle of the ﬁrst years of the 21st century brought to the fore an 
issue that has for some time been a major focus of political concern in 
Europe—the “missing jobs” or “employment gap.” In the early 1970s 
the employment rate in the European Union economies
1 was marginally 
above the rate in the United States. Over the ensuing quarter-century 
the United States forged ahead in job creation while in Europe employ­
ment growth was at best sluggish. By the initial years of the new millen­
nium the employment rate in the economies of the European Union aver­
aged 65.3 percent of the population of working age, while in the United 
States  it had  risen  to 74.4  percent.  This gap  of  over nine  percentage 
points represents around 25 million “missing jobs” in the EU. In response 
to this, and to the concomitant problems of higher unemployment rates, 
the prevalence of long-term unemployment, premature withdrawal from 
the  labor  force,  and  limited  employment  opportunities  for  women  in 
many (but not all) EU countries, the EU Heads of Government at their 
Lisbon summit in 2000 adopted the objective of raising the employment 
rate  across  the  European  economies  by  almost  ten  percentage  points 
within the following decade. If this ambitious objective is to be realized, 
even with some slippage beyond 2010, it is essential to gain an under­
standing of the factors that have given rise to the employment gap be­
tween the European Union and the United States. 
There is no dearth of candidate explanations for Europe’s poor em­
ployment performance. The most prominent have been those that center 
on labor market institutions of “social Europe” and the rigidities that 
they introduce: trade union power in wage bargaining, and the manda­
tory or conventional extension of bargaining outcomes to nonunionized 
workplaces;  employment  protection  provisions;  minimum  wages;  the 
generosity of unemployment beneﬁt systems; the size of the tax wedge 
of payroll, income and consumption taxes between the wage cost to the 
1 We are referring to the relevant group of countries rather than the political entity. In 
1970 the EU still comprised only the original six countries; the membership of 15 was 
reached in 1995. The enlarged EU of 25 members from 2005 lies outside our scope. 2  •  Gregory, Salverda, and Schettkat 
employer, inﬂuencing labor demand, and the take-home pay of the work­
er, affecting its supply. This view, given initial impetus by the OECD’s 
Jobs Study  of unemployment in  the advanced economies in  the early 
1990s (OECD 1994), has a natural resonance with U.S. commentators 
but also has support within Europe.
2 Its inﬂuence can be seen in contem­
porary policy stances. In the United Kingdom the Labour government 
through  Chancellor  Gordon  Brown  has  claimed  a  strong  macroeco­
nomic record in conjunction with its deregulated labor market. In the 
face of unemployment rates of 10 percent or above, Germany has at­
tempted to seek major changes to its social insurance and unemployment 
beneﬁt arrangements with the Hartz reforms, while France has retreated 
from the legislated 35-hour working week. 
Even as these latter economies edge towards reform the argument on 
the centrality of labor market rigidities is losing its cohesion as the links 
between labor market institutions and employment performance are put 
under detailed scrutiny. The conjunction of labor market rigidities and 
high unemployment is increasingly accepted as involving only a minority 
of EU economies, albeit several of the major ones: Germany, France, 
Italy, and Spain. Rigidities in product and ﬁnancial markets are coming 
under the spotlight, with restrictions to competition, innovation, and the 
creation of new ﬁrms all seen as inhibiting employment growth. Most 
tellingly,  the  emergence  in  the  United  States  of  jobless  growth,  more 
typical of European experience, is undermining the easy invocation of 
the job creation capability of the unregulated U.S. labor market. 
The employment  gap between the  United States and Europe  is not 
simply about jobs. Not only are more Americans in employment, but 
they  work  more  hours  per  week  and  more  weeks  per  year,  mainly 
through shorter vacation entitlements and even shorter vacations actu­
ally taken. Per head of the working-age population Americans work an 
average of 25.1 hours each week of the year, the Germans 18.0 and the 
French 17.4. This implies that hours worked per person in France and 
Germany are around 70 percent of the U.S. level. As with the jobs gap, 
these differences are of recent origin. In the early 1970s hours worked 
per person of working age were approximately the same in the United 
States and Europe. Americans continue to work broadly the same hours 
as in 1970 but have raised their participation rate substantially. Europe­
ans now work much shorter hours and have failed to compensate for 
this decline in hours by a rising participation rate. This poses the ques­
tion: why does the population of the world’s richest country work so 
much, while less wealthy continental Europeans take leisure? 
If this reﬂects social and cultural attitudes between the two sides of 
2 Leading exponents include Siebert (1997), Nickell and Layard (1999), and Nickell (2003). Introduction  •  3 
the Atlantic, why has this divergence emerged so dramatically since the 
early seventies? Frank (1999) argues in Luxury Fever that cultural atti­
tudes are themselves shaped by the economic context of national life. 
The consumption patterns of the American income elite, whose incomes 
have been rising substantially in recent decades, stimulate consumption 
by less well-off Americans. In a book that has received widespread atten­
tion Warren and Tyagi (2003) make the argument that access to a public 
infrastructure that is increasingly diverging in quality, especially in the 
quality of schools, is pushing Americans into a spending race. To gain 
access to good schools, often located in the suburbs, households now 
require two incomes in order to be able to meet the higher housing and 
transport costs involved. As a result of these spending pressures, they 
argue, double-income families are in real terms no better off. 
In a provocative recent contribution American Nobel laureate Prescott 
(2004) claims that “virtually all the large differences between the U.S. 
labor supply and those of Germany and France are due to differences in 
tax systems,” particularly the higher income tax rates in Europe. This is 
a striking claim, as he acknowledges he had expected the major inﬂu­
ences to be institutional constraints on the operation of labor markets 
and the nature of the unemployment beneﬁt system. 
Prescott’s diagnosis has come under vigorous challenge from Alesina, 
Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005), who also reject any appeal to deep cul­
tural differences between a European approach to leisure and the worka­
holism of the United States. Instead they revert to the theme of labor 
market institutions, but with a new twist. Noting the sustained role of 
collective bargaining in continental Europe over the relevant time frame, 
they focus on the commitment by European labor unions to a policy of 
“work less, work all” in support of employment. Their argument is that, 
while this has failed to increase employment overall, it may have had a 
society-wide inﬂuence on leisure patterns through a “social multiplier” 
where the value of leisure is enhanced as more people participate. Ale­
sina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote then raise the question whether union poli­
cies and regulations to which they have led, such as legally mandated 
holidays,  are  suboptimal  in  distorting  labor  supply  decisions.  Or  are 
they in fact welfare-improving for the European countries, as Blanchard 
(2004) argues? General reductions in working hours achieved through 
collective bargaining may solve the coordination problem, allowing ev­
eryone to enjoy a lower-hours equilibrium than a competitive individu­
alistic market would sustain (Schelling 1975). 
The United States–Europe comparison can be taken a step further in 
a way that places the performance of the European economies in a more 
favorable  light.  Productivity  growth  has  been  much  faster  in  Europe 
than in the United States over the last 30 years, such that productivity 4  •  Gregory, Salverda, and Schettkat 
in Europe is now converging on the U.S. level. Since 1970 GDP per hour 
worked in the EU has risen from 65 to over 90 percent of its level in the 
United States, and in France it has even exceeded it in several recent 
years. This has occurred over a period in which the gap in GDP per 
head has remained virtually constant, with the European economies at 
70 percent of the U.S. level. Just how dramatic these changes have been 
is shown in ﬁgure I.1, where the gap in GDP per head is decomposed 
among productivity per hour worked, mean hours of work per worker, 
the share of the working-age population in work (the employment rate), 
and the share of the working-age population in the total population.
3 
Until  the  mid-1970s  the  United  States  was  the  clear  productivity 
leader with the EU countries partly compensating for the effect of their 
lower productivity on GDP per head through a higher employment rate 
and longer working hours. From the mid-1970s there was  signiﬁcant 
reversal in both these dimensions. U.S. labor input increased markedly 
through both the employment rate and hours of work, while in Europe 
employment  rates  remained  stagnant  and  working  hours  fell  sharply; 
these combined movements reversed the negative U.S. balance in labor 
input. At the same time the huge initial productivity lead of the United 
States was substantially eroded. By the 1990s the U.S. advantage in per 
capita income was being maintained largely through higher labor input 
supplementing its much reduced superiority in productivity.
4  The later 
years of the 1990s saw a partial reversal of this picture, sustained into 
the 2000s. Productivity growth in the United States recovered to rates 
last seen in the 1960s. This resurgence has, however, slowed down the 
“great American jobs machine,” such that the U.S. growth pattern be­
3 GDP per head of population can be written as 
Y  Y hE  E  pop15−65 = ∗ ∗  ∗  , 
poptot  hE E  pop15−65  poptot 
where  Y  denotes  GDP,  pop  is  population  with  subscripts  tot  for  total  and  15–65  for 
working age, h denotes hours of work, and E is persons employed. Using logs, the differ­
ence between the United States and Europe can be expressed as the sum of the differences 
in the components: 
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Fig. I.1. Contributions to the Gap in GDP per Head of Population, 1970–2001 
(U.S. less EU at PPP prices)

Source: Computations are based on OECD data (Economic Outlook database,

OECD PPP benchmarks [OECD 2002]).

gins to appear to parallel European experience (see Gordon, this volume; 
Schettkat 2004). In the succinct summary given by Blanchard (2004) the 
main difference in economic performance over the past 30 years is that 
Europe has used its higher rate of productivity growth to increase leisure 
as well as income, while the United States has forgone additional leisure 
in favor exclusively of higher income.
5 
The most direct route to higher income is the two-earner household, 
with high female labor market participation. The share of two-earner 
couples is some ten percentage points higher in the United States (and 
the United Kingdom) than in other European countries, and the shortfall 
in female employment in Europe is the largest single source of the U.S.­
EU jobs gap (Salverda, Bazen, and Gregory 2001). Two-earner house­
holds and long-hours workers buy from the market goods and services 
that, at lower employment rates, would be provided within the house­
5 This broad-brush description relates to the European countries as a group and ignores 
much cross-country variation. Employment rates are high in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom;  hours  of  work  declined  dramatically  in  the  Netherlands  but  not  the  United 
Kingdom; productivity differences with the United States are now minor except in the 
United Kingdom and Spain, with France in particular in some years exceeding U.S. levels 
of output per hour. 6  •  Gregory, Salverda, and Schettkat 
hold: child care and elder care, house maintenance and cleaning, ready 
meals and meals outside the home, valeting services for the income-rich 
and time-poor. This perspective has been further developed by Freeman 
and Schettkat (2005), who note that hours spent in market work have 
been declining for men while they have increased for women, especially 
in the United States, with the major difference in time spent in market 
work  occurring  among  women  in  the  core  age  group  25–54.  In  the 
1990s overall working hours were remarkably similar for American and 
European women. However, the average American woman was allocat­
ing 50 percent of her working hours to the market and 50 percent to 
the household, while her European counterpart was spending two-thirds 
of her working hours on home production and only one-third in the 
market. This substitution of home production by market purchases of 
goods and services, a development that has been labeled marketization, 
has proceeded further in the United States than Europe. As Freeman and 
Schettkat further argue, this difference in marketization and the alloca­
tion of working time sustains a higher level of market demand, and one 
that comprises a different mix of purchases, with a particular orientation 
towards services (see also Freeman, this volume). 
This insight on the role of marketization is a fruitful starting point for 
an alternative approach to the U.S.-EU employment gap, through de­
mand differences. A striking feature of United States–Europe compari­
sons is that the gap in demand per head of population is considerably 
greater than the income gap, and has been widening over recent years 
as the employment gap has become established. A further, frequently 
neglected, fact is that the transatlantic employment gap is highly skewed, 
concentrated almost entirely in certain services. Although the industrial­
ized economies are now all “service economies,” this description applies 
with particular force to the United States. The share of services in U.S. 
ﬁnal demand is around ten percentage points higher than in the Euro­
pean economies. While the shift of output and employment towards ser­
vices continues everywhere, this “services gap” shows no sign of dimin­
ishing. 
Two well-known explanations have been put forward for the increas­
ing  role  of  services  in  a  modern  economy.  The  “hierarchy  of  needs” 
postulates a shift into the consumption of services as income rises. More 
precisely, Fuchs (1980) has shown that the share of services in overall 
employment follows a logistic curve against income per capita, a rela­
tionship that continues to hold. Baumol’s (1967) “cost disease,” on the 
other hand, suggests that important areas of service provision are tech­
nologically stagnant and therefore experience rising relative prices, re­
sulting in larger shares of expenditure and employment being concen­
trated in services. Both these approaches are directed to explaining the Introduction  •  7 
rising share of services within an economy over time. Our focus is the 
international comparative one. Why is the role of the service sector so 
much larger in the United States? In particular, how far do differences in 
levels and patterns of demand, including the marketization of household 
production,  explain  the  United  States–Europe  differences  in  employ­
ment? 
This major research agenda was addressed in the international project 
Demand Patterns and Employment Growth: Consumption and Services 
in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and 
the United States (abbreviated DEMPATEM). The objective of the proj­
ect was to examine how far differences in demand patterns, particularly 
for services by households, could account for the employment gap be­
tween the United States and these various EU economies. The analysis 
spans both the level and the structure of demand at the macroeconomic 
level  and  its  detailed  composition  at  the  household  level.  To  do  this 
effectively required the assembly of a multinational research team to pre­
pare comparable micro-level data on the expenditure patterns and char­
acteristics  of  households,  and  on  employment.  The  research  program 
was constructed to be an integrated whole, while representing the range 
of  European  economic  models  and  experiences.  Together  the  ﬁve  se­
lected economies comprise 70 percent of the population of the EU-15. 
Germany and France are the major economies of the continental EU, 
and key representatives of the European “social model” and its current 
employment challenges. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands fea­
ture considerable success in employment growth, and dimensions of la­
bor market ﬂexibility, particularly in the substantial role of part-time 
work. Spain represents the new, fast-growing economies in the west and 
southern regions; it has its own approach to the employment problem 
through ﬁxed-term contracts. The main economies not represented are 
the Scandinavian group, whose socioeconomic model is sui generis and, 
while widely respected, is not attracting imitators. The United States is 
taken as the benchmark throughout. 
The  framework  for  the  DEMPATEM  project  combines  micro-level 
analysis of demand and employment patterns with economy-wide multi­
sectoral modeling of their linkages. Patterns of household consumption 
expenditure recorded in budget surveys are analyzed on a comparable 
basis across countries, with as much disaggregation, particularly of ser­
vices, as the data allow. Differences in household composition and in 
the labor market participation of household members are incorporated. 
Harmonized input-output tables for each country trace the implications 
of demand patterns for the sectoral structure of production and levels 
and patterns of employment. The period analyzed, the 1970s to the late 
1990s, brought signiﬁcant structural change affecting consumption, pro­8  •  Gregory, Salverda, and Schettkat 
duction,  and  employment.  In  the  EU  economies  the  real  incomes  of 
households rose at historically high rates, bringing rising levels of con­
sumption and living standards, a development that was more muted in 
the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic production patterns were 
increasingly characterized by deindustrialization and the continuing shift 
to services. Outsourcing, increasingly involving offshoring, was hollow­
ing out manufacturing industry, in part replacing activities previously 
conducted within manufacturing by bought-in supplies, particularly of 
services. Business services, supplying to producers, became one of the 
fastest-growing sectors, as service-to-service supply chains in particular 
were developed. In employment, although each country experienced the 
shift to services, the striking characteristic was the divergence between 
the rising employment rates in the United States and their static record 
in the EU, giving rise to the employment gap. 
The following chapters draw on the DEMPATEM analysis and the 
invited contributions to analyze a range of facets of the role of the ser­
vice sector in the employment experience of the United States and the 
EU over recent decades. 
In  chapter  1  Wiemer  Salverda  and  Ronald  Schettkat  introduce  the 
analysis by highlighting the nature and source of the employment gap. 
In its emergence and persistence an association can be seen between the 
employment  gap  and  the  gap  in  expenditure  per  head  (the  “demand 
gap”) between the United States and Europe. The employment gap is 
concentrated in the service sector, and within that in two areas, most 
importantly distribution, hotels, and catering, followed by community 
and  personal  services.  Consumption  dominates  demand  in  both  the 
United States and Europe, but particularly in the United States. Demand 
for services dominates in consumption, again particularly in the United 
States. The level and composition of private household expenditures are 
strongly inﬂuenced by institutional arrangements, with the public sector 
frequently an important provider of services for consumption in Europe 
that are provided privately in the United States. When services that are 
publicly provided for individual consumption, such as health care and 
education, are reallocated to private consumption, collective consump­
tion  emerges  as  taking  a  remarkably  similar  share  of  demand  in  the 
United States and in Europe. The rising relative price of services every­
where is conﬁrmed. At purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars, however, 
services overall emerge as more expensive in the United States, although 
this relates heavily to education and health care rather than to marketed 
services  such  as  hotels,  restaurants,  and  recreational  services.  A  ﬁnal 
section reviews the main hypotheses that have been put forward to ex­
plain the rising share of services and indicates how these have been ap­
proached in the chapters that follow. Introduction  •  9 
It was Victor Fuchs whose crucial contributions in the 1960s along­
side those of William Baumol launched the debate on the reasons for 
the growing importance of the service sector. In chapter 2 Fuchs looks 
back at his own arguments in the light of the experience and enhanced 
knowledge gained over the intervening decades. He conﬁrms with up­
dated empirical support his famous ﬁnding on the rise in the employ­
ment  share  of  services  and  its  strong  statistical  relationship  to  GDP 
growth both across countries and over time within countries. Explaining 
this phenomenon, however, he still views as a difﬁcult task. He endorses 
as the two main candidate explanations the differential growth in de­
mand for services due to their higher income elasticity, on the one side, 
and low productivity growth in their production, on the other. He is, 
however, pessimistic about the possibility of successfully disentangling 
their relative contributions. The great stumbling block that he notes is 
the difﬁculty of achieving accurate measurement of service sector output 
(and therefore productivity). In health care, one of the largest service 
industries,  developments  in  diagnosis  and  treatment  bring  not  only 
longer lives but lives of higher quality. More subtly, part of the output 
of health care takes the form of caring—valued by the patient and prop­
erly a part of the industry’s output, but again rarely measured. A further 
difﬁculty for the measurement of productivity, peculiar to services, is the 
contribution of the consumer as a cooperating agent in their production. 
In making her selections in the supermarket she contributes to produc­
tivity  in  retailing,  while  how  well  she  follows  her  medication  regime 
inﬂuences the productivity of her health care professionals. Fuchs con­
cludes by indicating the pervasive implications of the growth of the “ser­
vice economy”: more employment opportunities for women, more self-
employment, a greater role for small ﬁrms and nonproﬁt organizations, 
and, perhaps most fundamentally, the greater “personalization” of work. 
William Baumol’s seminal contribution in 1967 has caused his name 
to become inextricably bound up with the “cost disease” hypothesis, in 
which the growing share of services in the economy is attributed to the 
slow evolution of labor productivity in this sector. Baumol reminds us 
that he has always been happy to acknowledge that changing prefer­
ences in favor of services may also contribute to the growing employ­
ment  share  of  services—this  may  even  enhance  the  role  of  the  cost-
disease story, as he puts it. In his present contribution (chapter 3) he 
develops the cost disease approach a step further, probing within the 
service sector. He distinguishes three types of service, stagnant, progres­
sive, and what he terms asymptotically stagnant. These are differentiated 
by their productivity characteristics. Stagnant services, of which health 
and education are leading instances, are characterized by the “handicraft 
attributes” of personal contact, preventing productivity gains and giving 10  •  Gregory, Salverda, and Schettkat 
rise to cost disease. On the other hand, many of the services involved in 
the “new economy,” such as telecommunications, where personal con­
tact is not involved, achieve sometimes spectacular productivity growth. 
In an initially surprising and apparently paradoxical claim he then iden­
tiﬁes a third set of services, asymptotically stagnant sectors, related to 
R&D and innovative activity. These services are not only subject to the 
cost  disease  themselves,  but  also  “in  some  sense  may  be  deemed  the 
ultimate source of the problem.” The contribution of R&D and innova­
tion  is  the  ultimate  source  of  the  remarkable  growth  of  productivity 
achieved  in  agriculture  and  manufacturing.  This  productivity  growth 
brings about these sectors’ ever-diminishing share in employment. The 
“asymptotically stagnant” sectors themselves use inputs from both stag­
nant and progressive sources. Initially costs fall due to the progressive 
inputs, but then rise asymptotically as the inputs from stagnant sources 
take  an  ever-increasing  share.  R&D  exempliﬁes  the  asymptotic  stag­
nancy as stagnant mental work—we are no more proﬁcient than Isaac 
Newton—is combined with equipment such as computers from progres­
sive sources. In due course, Baumol suggests, the growing costs of R&D 
will lower  demand for these  services, slowing the pace  of innovation 
everywhere including in goods production and mitigating the cost dis­
ease. He ends, however, in more upbeat mode, drawing on the conclu­
sion from Oulton (2001) that, where asymptotically stagnant services, 
such as innovation, contribute intermediate inputs to other sectors, any 
nonzero productivity growth will contribute additively to productivity 
in the production of ﬁnal output. 
In chapter 4 Mary Gregory and Giovanni Russo address the DEM­
PATEM agenda directly, analyzing the impact of demand patterns on 
employment  using  an  input-output  framework  applied  to  the  United 
States and the ﬁve EU economies. The key concept that they use is the 
employment  generated  economy-wide  in  supplying  each  product  or 
service  to  ﬁnal  demand;  this  encapsulates  the  employment  created  at 
all  stages  of  the  production  process,  reﬂecting  technologies  adopted 
throughout the supply chain. When employment intensity is measured 
on this basis, some striking results emerge that throw an important new 
light on the transatlantic employment comparison. The employment in­
tensities  of  services  and  goods  production  emerge  as  approximately 
equal; the popular wisdom of the greater employment intensity of ser­
vices emerges as an illusion, based on the ﬁnal stage of delivery only. At 
the same time ﬁnal demands originating in both services and “manufac­
turing” (i.e. nonservices) are increasingly generating jobs located in ser­
vices. The ﬁnal demand mixes of the European economies are more em­
ployment-friendly than the U.S. pattern; the demand mixes of all the 
European countries would raise U.S. employment, while the U.S. mix Introduction  •  11 
would result in lower employment in the European economies. On the 
other hand the European consumption patterns tend to be less employ­
ment-friendly than that of the United States. The consumption patterns 
of France and Germany would reduce U.S. employment by 3–5 percent 
respectively; conversely, if the U.S. consumption mix were adopted in 
the European economies, the level of employment there would be 2–4 
percent  higher.  The  most  striking  ﬁnding  from  Gregory  and  Russo’s 
analysis is that demand growth has been the major source of employ­
ment  growth,  offset  by  job  losses  through  labor  productivity  gains. 
Structural change along the supply chain, including outsourcing, both 
creates and destroys jobs, with only a small net effect. In the United 
States stronger demand growth has brought more job creation, while 
weaker productivity gains have been less job-destroying than in the Eu­
ropean economies. These are the major factors that have opened up the 
employment gap. 
This macro picture arising from the DEMPATEM research is comple­
mented by the comparative analysis of household consumption patterns 
reported by Adriaan Kalwij and Stephen Machin in chapter 5. This rests 
on six detailed country contributions by John Schmitt for the United 
States, Laura Blow for the United Kingdom, Marijke van Deelen and 
Ronald Schettkat for Germany, Franc ¸ois Gardes and Christophe Starzec 
for France, Adriaan Kalwij and Wiemer Salverda for the Netherlands, 
and Javier Ruiz-Castillo and Marı ´a-Jose ´  Luengo-Prado for Spain. The 
analysis is based on household budget surveys for each country. A major 
problem for the cross-country analysis of household expenditure pat­
terns is the varying role of public provision, particularly in health care 
and education. The analysis here is restricted to those expenditures that 
are unaffected by the differing public/private split in provision across 
the six countries, giving coverage of between 55 and 75 percent of total 
average  household  expenditures  in  each  country.  Kalwij  and  Machin 
document the strong increase in expenditure on housing and other ser­
vices, notably food and beverages away from home, private transporta­
tion, and communication services at the expense of the budget share of 
food and nonalcoholic beverages. In all countries the relative price of 
services has risen. The level of total household expenditure emerges as 
the most important inﬂuence on the rising budget share of services over 
time, with a further, smaller, impact from the changing demographic 
composition of households, including the rise of two-earner households. 
Overall the shift towards services runs parallel between the United States 
and Europe, but with the United States at a higher level. A wealth of 
further  detail  on  consumption  patterns  is  available  in  the  individual 
country reports among the DEMPATEM working papers listed at the 
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Following the theme of the importance of differences within the ser­
vice sector, chapter 6 by Andrew Glyn, Joachim Mo ¨ ller, Wiemer Sal­
verda, John Schmitt, and Michel Sollogoub takes as its focus retailing, 
along with hotels and catering. Within private services this sector makes 
the biggest single contribution to the transatlantic employment gap. It is 
the service sector most closely related to the consumption activities of 
households, and is exclusively in the market sector of the economy. In all 
countries these industries’ workforce is biased towards women, young 
workers, and the low skilled, groups whose wage position would be at 
risk without the protection of collective bargaining or wage regulation. 
However, the authors’ analysis of the wage structure in retailing relative 
to the rest of the economy shows that the retail sector in the United 
States is not able to exploit the higher wage ﬂexibility often claimed and 
pay lower wages relative to regulated Europe. They conclude that differ­
ing wage patterns are not a dominant source of employment differences 
between the United States and Europe in these sectors. Examining rela­
tive productivity and its growth, the authors ﬁnd that stronger produc­
tivity growth in the distributive services in the European economies con­
tributed to the jobs gap in this sector only in the 1970s; in the two later 
decades this effect disappears. Labor market inﬂexibilities, prompting 
the substitution of capital for labor and forcing “excessive” labor pro­
ductivity, do not appear to have been the fundamental restraint on Euro­
pean services, particularly in the 1990s. Their main ﬁnding is that the 
much  higher  volume  of  goods  consumption  per  capita  in  the  United 
States as compared to Europe—the “throughput” in distribution—is the 
main proximate factor behind the employment gap in retailing. Produc­
tivity  is  somewhat  higher  in  European retailing  but  this  plays  only  a 
subsidiary role. 
In chapter 7 Robert Gordon also tackles the question of relative U.S. 
performance in retailing, but set in the context of the dramatic loss of 
ground by the European economies since 1995. This short span of years 
has  seen  Europe’s  growth  rate  of  output  per  hour  drop  to  only  half 
the rate in the United States, wiping out fully one-ﬁfth of the European 
productivity catch-up of the previous half-century (from 44 to 94 per­
cent of the U.S. level, and then back to 85 percent). His main theme is 
that the discussion of policy reform in Europe has focused too narrowly 
on deregulation of labor and product markets when recent trends reﬂect 
much more fundamental lifestyle choices. Gordon notes that much of 
the  acceleration  of  U.S.  productivity  growth  in  this  period  originates 
with distribution, particularly retailing, driven by the move to the “big 
box” retailing format on a large plot of land in a sprawling metropolitan 
area. He sees this as an example of “American exceptionalism,” reﬂect­
ing an attitude to urban growth that contrasts with the land-use plan­Introduction  •  13 
ning and regulation found in Europe. A further area that Gordon ad­
dresses is the growing American dominance in many frontier areas of 
innovation.  While  this  is  fueled  by  information  and  communication 
technology (ICT), its roots lie deeper in many features contributing to 
the  more  favorable  environment  for  innovation  in  the  United  States. 
While these institutions and lifestyle choices may not be universally ad­
mired on either side of the Atlantic, the rapid reopening of the produc­
tivity gap between Europe over the past few years is a sharp reminder 
of their fundamental importance. 
Richard Freeman (chapter 8) examines the “marketization” hypothe­
sis, that higher employment in the United States is due to the more ex­
tensive  shift  of  traditional  household  production—food  preparation, 
childcare, care of the elderly, domestic cleaning—to the market there 
than in Europe. Using time-use surveys and other sources, he shows that 
household production is lower in the United States than in Europe. As 
he notes, the marketization of household production is a powerful devel­
opment as it works on both sides of the labor market to increase em­
ployment. On the supply side, when more women work in the market, 
taking the time from household production rather than leisure or the 
market time of other household members, household production is re­
duced. This increases market demand for replacement goods and ser­
vices,  either  directly  through  the  purchase  of,  for  example,  cleaning 
services, or indirectly through the nature of goods purchased, such as 
prepared meals in the supermarket, all of which generate additional em­
ployment. The differing extent of marketization affects the composition 
as well as the level of employment. Given the historical concentration of 
women  in  household  production  the  marketization  argument  applies 
most readily to differences in women’s employment, a major dimension 
of the United States–Europe employment gap. Increased engagement in 
paid work by more highly educated women, whose comparative advan­
tage is likely to lie in market-based employment, will increase demand 
for lower-skilled workers to replace them in carrying out domestic jobs. 
Chapter 9 brings together the insights into the role of services that 
emerge from the analyses in the earlier chapters, relating them to the 
various explanatory hypotheses to gauge their relative force. Unsurpris­
ingly, given its widespread and complex roles, the growing prominence 
of the service sector is found to reﬂect a range of inﬂuences involving the 
behavior of households, ﬁrms, and governments. The greater orientation 
towards services of the U.S. economy can be seen as accounting for part 
of the United States–Europe employment gap. More strikingly, however, 
the period from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s appears to have been 
exceptional on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States it featured 
remarkable expansion of employment but with only limited productivity 14  •  Gregory, Salverda, and Schettkat 
gains; in the European economies it was characterized by strong produc­
tivity growth but sluggish employment. The emerging record of the de­
cade since the mid-1990s suggests some reversal of these patterns. In the 
United States productivity growth has been remarkably strong relative 
to previous decades, while employment growth has slackened. In Eu­
rope, on the other hand, employment growth is becoming less sluggish, 
while productivity growth is faltering. Extrapolating these trends would 
suggest that the United States–Europe employment gap will start to nar­
row, while the productivity gap may again widen. We see the driving 
force behind the range of developments described in the individual chap­
ters as the ongoing search for efﬁciency gains through specialization and 
the  division  of  labor,  implemented  through  the  market.  The  growing 
role of the service sector epitomizes this process and carries it forward. 